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A blind trust, as discussed in this report, is a device employed by a federal official
to hold, administer and manage the private financial assets, investments and ownerships
of the official, and his or her spouse and dependant children, as a method of conflict of
interest avoidance. In establishing a qualified blind trust upon the approval of the
appropriate supervisory ethics entity, the official transfers, without restriction, control
and management of private assets to an independent trustee who may not communicate
information about the identity of the holdings in the trust to the official. The trust is
considered “blind” because eventually, through the sale of transferred assets and the
purchase of new ones, the public officer will be shielded from knowledge of the identity
of the specific assets in the trust. Without such knowledge, conflict of interest issues
would be avoided because no particular asset in the trust could act as an influence upon
the official duties that the officer performs for the Government.
This report provides a brief discussion of the use of “blind trusts” by federal officials
in the context of conflict of interest regulation and avoidance. Initially, it should be noted
that there is no federal statute which expressly requires that particular federal officials, or
categories of officials, place their assets into a “blind trust” upon entering public service
with the Federal Government. Rather, the use of a “blind trust” is one of several methods
of conflict of interest avoidance under federal law and regulation. There are now uniform
statutory requirements for the establishment and maintenance of blind trusts, and federal
officials who are to use such devices, either voluntarily or as a remedial measure for
identified conflicts of interest, must receive prior approval of the proposed trustee and the
trust instrument before transferring assets to qualify the blind trust for ethics purposes.
Background: Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure and Disqualification.
The body of federal law and regulation concerning conflicts of interest and the
private assets and investments of federal officials is generally directed at the concern, as
expressed by the Supreme Court, “that an impairment of impartial judgment can occur in
even the most well-meaning men when their personal economic interests are affected by
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1 United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549 (1960).
2 H. R. Rpt. No. 748, 87th Congress, 1st Session, at 3 (1961). House Judiciary Committee report
on the comprehensive amendments and revisions to conflict of interest laws in 1962.
3 H. R. Rpt. No. 748, supra at 4-6: “The attainment of one or more of these ends is impaired
whenever there exists, or appears to exist an actual or potential conflict between the private
interests of a Government employee and his duties as an official.” See also, Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Conflict of Interest and Federal Service, at 3-4 (1960).
4 18 U.S.C. § 208.
5 The President and Vice President are now expressly exempt from the disqualification law (18
U.S.C. § 202(c)), as are Members of Congress.
6 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.501, 2635.502.
7 P.L. 95-521, as amended; see now 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101 et seq. In addition to public disclosures
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the business they transact on behalf of the Government.”1 The underlying principle of
federal conflict of interest regulation thus embodies the axiom “that a public servant owes
undivided loyalty to the Government,”2 and that official decisions, advice and
recommendations of officers of the Government be made in the public interest and not be
tainted, even unintentionally, with influence from private or personal financial interests.3
It is assumed, of course, that persons in or entering into Government service will own and
possess financial assets, instruments and property to a somewhat similar extent as those
comparably situated in the general population. Federal officers and employees are not,
however, expected to divest themselves of all their worldly goods to avoid conflicts of
interest. Rather, with respect to a federal official’s personal ownership of assets, financial
instruments, and income-producing property, the principal methods of conflict of interest
regulation under federal law are disqualification and disclosure.
Disqualification. The principal federal conflict of interest law provides that an
official who administers federal law should not take any official action on, or make
recommendations concerning any particular governmental matter in which that official,
or one closely associated with the official, has a personal “financial interest.”4 That is,
a federal official in the executive branch of Government, other than the President or Vice
President,5 must generally “recuse” or disqualify himself or herself from participating in
any particular governmental matter in which he or she has a financial interest, or in which
his or her spouse, dependant children, partner, or business with which he or she is
associated, has a financial interest. Executive branch officials mayalso be required, under
regulations promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics [OGE], to recuse themselves
from certain governmental matters affecting an even broader category of persons or
entities with whom they have a “covered relationship.”6
Disclosure. To enforce conflict of interest provisions, to deter the ownership of
assets which may raise ethical problems, and to provide public information and
assurances concerning the ethical conduct of high-level Government officials, the identity
and categories of amount of one’s assets, ownerships, and property (as well as other
detailed financial information), must be publicly disclosed by high-level federal officials
upon entering Government and every year thereafter, under the provisions of the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978.7 Generally, the identity of the assets and ownerships of a
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required by law of high-ranking officials, confidential disclosures to employing agencies may be
required from certain rank-and-file federal employees. 5 C.F.R. § 2634.901 et seq.
8 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(1). The three exceptions to required disclosure of the underlying assets
in a trust are (1) a “qualified blind trust,” (2) a trust created by a third party for the official, the
official’s spouse, and/or children when the official has no knowledge of the assets in the trust,
and (3) a “qualified diversified trust.” 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 102(f)(2), (3)-(7), and (8).
9 Even before the express statutory exemption (18 U.S.C. § 202(c)) was adopted, the
disqualification law was interpreted not to apply to the President and Vice President since a
statutory recusal rule might in theory interfere with such officers’ duties required under the
Constitution. See discussion in Department of Justice letter opinion to Senator Cannon,
Chairman of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, September 20, 1974. The recusal
law has never applied to Members of Congress since a mandatory disqualification would be
tantamount to a disenfranchisement and loss of representation for the Members’ constituents.
10 5 U.S.C. app. §106(b)(3); 5 C.F.R. § 2634.605(b)(5)(ii).
11 There is no law generally requiring federal employees to divest holdings. In some cases a
statutory provision, often the organic act establishing an agency or commission, will provide that
the directors or board members of such entities shall have no financial interests in the business
or sector which the agency regulates or oversees. Furthermore, an agency may by regulation
prohibit or restrict the ownership of certain financial assets by its officers and employees where,
because of the mission of the agency, such interests would “cause a reasonable person to question
the impartiality and objectivity with which agency programs are administered.” 5 C.F.R. §
2635.403(a). In such instances, these provisions may, in effect, require the divestiture of
particular assets and holdings of certain individuals in or to be appointed to such positions.
covered official, such as stocks, bonds, interests in income-producing real property, stock
options, futures, mutual fund shares, and partnership shares, even those interests held in
a “trust” managed by an independent trustee for the benefit of the official, are required to
be disclosed by the public official in his or her disclosure reports, unless the trust meets
one of the three exceptions in the law, including a “qualified blind trust.”8 For elected
federal officials, that is, Members of Congress, the President and Vice President, public
financial disclosure and the attendant publicity is the principal method of conflict of
interest regulation, as such constitutional officers are not required by statute to disqualify
or recuse themselves from the performance of their constitutional duties.9
Remedial Measures for Conflicting Assets.
Financial disclosure reports from covered officials, including the original entrance
reports and the annual reports filed by May 15, are to be reviewed by supervisory ethics
personnel to identify potential ethics and conflict problems, and to resolve any conflict
of interest issues that may be raised by the ownership of certain assets by a particular
public official. Remedial action which may be required by ethics officials to resolve
identified conflicts of interest with respect to certain assets may include divestiture,
establishment of a qualified blind trust, procurement of conflict of interest waivers,
specific written recusal instruments, and requests for voluntary transfer or reassignment.10
Although there is not a general divestiture requirement for federal officials entering
Government service,11 the regulation of federal conflict of interest law in the executive
branch provides that certain financial interests may, as noted above, necessitate some
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12 5 U.S.C. app. § 106(b)(3); see also 5 C.F.R. § 2634.605(b)(4),(5).
13 5 C.F.R. § 2635.403(b). When divestiture is required, an employee should be afforded a
“reasonable amount of time” to dispose of the asset; and it is possible to ameliorate potential
unfair tax burdens arising from such required sale by receiving a certificate of divestiture
postponing capital gains taxes. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.403(d),(e), and 2634.1001 et. seq.
14 5 U.S.C. app. § 101(b); 5 C.F.R § 2634.602(a),(c)(1)(vi); 5 C.F.R § 2634.605(c).
15 5 C.F.R. §2634.605(c)(2)(iii)(B).
16 Any “conditions” must be agreed to before a vote, as a confirmation vote itself may not be
“conditional.” Riddick and Fruman, Riddick’s Senate Procedure, S. Doc. 101-28, at 940 (1992).
remedial measure, including divestiture, for the official to come into compliance with
federal conflict of interest laws or regulations.12 Regulations issued by the Office of
Government Ethics indicate that when the ownership of a particular asset would require,
under federal law or regulation, an executive branch employee’s disqualification or
recusal from matters “so central or critical” to his or her job that it would “materially
impair[ ]” the employee’s ability to perform the official duties of the office, or where it
could adversely affect the agency’s mission because another employee could not easily
be substituted for the disqualified employee, then the official may be required by the
supervisory ethics office to “divest” that particular asset.13
Blind Trust as Remedial or Voluntary Measure.
In some instances, the establishment of a “qualified blind trust” may be used as a
conflict of interest avoidance device as an alternative to outright “divestiture” of particular
assets or to other remedial measures. In addition to the regular financial disclosure
reviews for conflicts of interest and possible remediations required, it should be noted
that officials who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, must file a disclosure statement within 5 days of nomination. The statement is
to be reviewed and any remedial action proposed by agency or department ethics officials,
then reviewed and approved by the Office of Government Ethics, and then forwarded to
the appropriate Senate committee.14 In the executive review process, an “ethics
agreement” may be entered into whereby the official, to avoid ethical and conflicts issues
with respect to particular assets, agrees to certain remedial action, including the transfer
of assets to a qualified blind trust, as an alternative to divestiture or to specific recusal or
disqualification agreements.15 The Senate committee initiallyreviewing such nomination,
or the Senate as a whole, may also require from the nominee an agreement for the
disposition of certain assets, including their sale or transfer to a blind trust as a condition
of favorable action on the nomination regardless of, or in addition to, any executive
branch actions and agreements.16
In addition to the establishment of a blind trust as a remedial measure for specific
conflicts of interest, blind trusts may also be created by officials on their own initiative
to avoid potential conflict issues and/or to ease reporting burdens. Blind trusts may be
used bysuch Government officials even when the disqualification requirements of federal
law do not apply to them, such as for Members of Congress, the President, and the Vice
President. If such trusts meet the requirements of “qualified blind trusts” under federal
law, then disclosure may be simplified for such officials, identifying only the trust itself
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17 5 U.S.C. app. §102(f)(2)(A).
18 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(4)(A); 5 C.F.R. § 2634.401(ii).
19 S. Rpt. No. 95-639, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
“Blind Trusts,” at 2-5, 13 (1978); 5 C.F.R. § 2634.401(b).
20 5 U.S.C. app. §102(f)(4)(A); 5 C.F.R. § 2634.401(a)(ii). An exception to this rule is provided
in certain circumstances for well-diversified, marketable assets placed in a trust when the assets
are not in the primary area of official responsibility of the Government officer. Note other
requirements for this exception at 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(4)(B)(i)(I) - (V).
21 S. Rpt. No. 95-639, supra at 6-7. See also OGE Opinion 86 x 12, September 8, 1986.
and the income derived from it, as opposed to listing and quantifying all of the individual
underlying assets and transactions involving them.
Requirements of a Qualified Blind Trust.
The nature of a “blind trust,” generally, is such that the federal official will have no
control over, will receive no communications about, and will (eventuallyas existing assets
are sold and new ones obtained by the trustee) have no knowledge of the identity of the
specific assets held in the trust. As such, once a blind trust is established and new assets
obtained, an official will not need to (and will not be able to) identify the particular assets
in the “blind trust” in future financial disclosure reports,17 and such assets will not be
considered “financial interests” of the official for disqualification purposes.18 The conflict
of interest theory under which the blind trust provisions operate is that since the official
will not know the identity of the specific assets in the trust, those assets and financial
interests could not act as influences on the official decisions and governmental duties of
the reporting official, thus avoiding potential conflict of interest problems or
appearances.19 Assets originally placed into the trust by the official will, of course, be
known to that official, and therefore will generally continue to be “financial interests” of
the public official for conflict of interest purposes until the trustee notifies the official
“that such asset has been disposed of, or has a value of less than $1,000.”20
Prior to 1978, there was no federal law or regulation providing guidance as to the
establishment, administration, and operation of a “blind trust” for federal officials. The
use and implementation of blind trusts were often personal decisions on the part of certain
federal officials to deflect criticism of conflicts of interest arising from particular personal
holdings, or were created at the insistence of a Senate committee as a requirement for
approval of a nomination. The provisions of these various trusts, as well as their
effectiveness in conflict of interest avoidance, however, varied widely, as there were no
uniform provisions for establishing such trusts, and no oversight or enforcement
mechanisms concerning the operations of these devices.21 With the passage of the Ethics
in Government Act in 1978, there were for the first time specific requirements and
uniform guidelines for the establishment, maintenance, operation and enforcement of
“blind trusts” for federal officials under conflict of interest law. Among the specific
requirements and features of a “qualified blind trust” under federal law are the following:
Prior approval. Before a trust may be a “qualified blind trust” for conflict of
interest purposes, the officer must receive prior approval of the trust instrument and
the trustee from the appropriate supervisory ethics office. 5 U.S.C. app. §
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102(f)(3)(D). In the executive branch, such office is the Office of Government
Ethics; in the Senate, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics; and in the House, the
House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.
Required filing of agreement and asset list. After the trust is established
the official, within 30 days, must file the executed trust agreement and a list of all
assets originally transferred to the trust, and their categories of value, to the
supervisory ethics office. 5 U.S.C. app. §102(f)(5)(A).
Independent trustee. The trustee for a qualified blind trust must be a
financial institution, a certified public accountant, an attorney, a broker, or an
investment advisor who is independent of the federal official or anyperson interested
in the trust, and whose officers or employees are similarly independent. Such
independence requires that the trustee and trust employees not be able to be
influenced by the official or other interested parties in investment decisions, and not
be “associated” or “affiliated” with, nor an employee, partner of or a relative of, the
public official or any interested party to the trust. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(3)(A).
Unconditional transfer. The trust instrument must provide that the trustee of
a blind trust has the freedom to be able to sell or dispose of any assets in the corpus
of the trust at his or her discretion, unless a restriction on particular assets is
expressly approved by the supervisory ethics office. 5 U.S.C. app. §102(f)(3)(B).
Prohibited assets. Assets originally transferred to the trust are still to be
considered “financial interests” of the official for conflict of interest purposes until
disposed of or their value becomes less than $1,000. 5 U.S.C. app. §102(f)(4)(A).
The trust should not contain in its inception any assets which the public official is
expressly prohibited from holding by federal law or regulation. 5 U.S.C. app.
§102(f)(3)(C)(ii); see OGE Advisory Opinion 86 x 12, September 8, 1986.
No communications. The trustee is prohibited from consulting, notifying or
communicating with the beneficiaries or other interested parties in the trust
concerning the identity of any asset in the trust, except to inform the officer when an
original asset has been disposed of or its value has become less than $1,000, as
required by law. The trustee is to prepare the tax return for the trust, and no reports
concerning the holdings of the trust, but rather only information on the value and
income of the trust as a whole, may be made to the official and interested parties.
5 U.S.C. app. §§102(f)(3)(C), 102(f)(6)(A).
No peeking. The beneficiaries of the blind trust may not attempt to gain
information about the identity of any assets held in the trust, and may not
communicate with the trustee except in writing as to general financial needs and
income, or directions to sell all of a certain original asset. 5 U.S.C. app. §§
102(f)(3)(C)(vi),(vii), 102(f)(6)(B).
Attorney General enforcement. The AttorneyGeneral is authorized to bring
civil action for violations of these laws concerning communications and disclosures
between trustees and blind trusts beneficiaries. 5 U.S.C. app. §102(f)(6)(c).
